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AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OR
JUDICIAL BALM?*
Convinced that public and private injury would result from
the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and
individuals, Congress declared that "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with any foreign nation,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor... ."I
Noteworthy, however, is the absence of a prohibition against
monopoly in the concrete, as distinguished from monopolization. 2
At least on a theoretical level, this omission can be attributed to
the faith in the working of market forces which may be expected
to prevent or cure monopoly if economic freedom is not restrained
by monopolization. 3 But as is so often the case, theory yields to
reality and a monopoly may prevail against the countervailing
forces supposedly destined to overcome it. The net result is the
*It is the intention off this paper to deal only with non-statutory monopolies,
i.e., those not created by patents or licenses lasting beyond their term.
'Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
2 A general distinction would be as follows: A monopoly exists where all
or nearly all of an article of trade or commerce within a community is brought
within the hands of one man or set of men, as to practically bring the handling
or production of the commodity or thing within such single control, to the
exclusion of competition or free traffic therein. F. Cooke Cooke on Combinations,
Monopolies, and Labor Unions § 116 (2d ed. 1909).
On the other hand, monopolization means:
to conspire, to acquire, or maintain the power to exclude competitors from
any part of the trade, or commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations, accompanied with such power that the parties are able as a group
to exclude actual or potential competition from the field, and accompanied
with the intent and purpose to exercise that power.
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
'In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911), the Court held,
ITihe omission of any direct prohibition against monopoly in the con-
crete indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to
contract when not unduly or improperly exercised is the most effective
means for the prevention of monopoly, since the operation of the centri-
fugal and centripetal forces resulting from the right to contract freely was
the means by which monopoly would inevitably be prevented if no extrane-
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exposure of the public to the same evils of monopoly. A monopoly
exists, yet it exists by virtue of effective competition, which com-
petition the Act was designed to foster. In attempting to reconcile
this paradox courts have had a most difficult task.
Although referred to as "the highly exceptional case, a rara
avis, more often found in academic groves than in the thickets of
business", jurists and legislators alike have recognized the possi-
bility that a monopoly may indeed be "thrust-upon" a company.
During the original congressional debates on section two, Senator
Hoar pointed out that monopoly involved something more than
extraordinary commercial success.5 Likewise, the United States
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the position that monopoly power
must be "distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent."6 The courts have "kept in reserve the possibility that the
origin of a monopoly may be critical in determining its legality."7
What engendered these compunctions is reasonably plain; persons
ous or soverign power imposed it and no right to make unlawful con-
tracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted.
More simply stated, a monopoly climate tends to induce new entrants into that
market whose entry, if competition is unfettered, lowers prices. Subsequently,
the weaker competitors fail and the market moves toward monopoly again,
followed by an increased number of new entrants, and so on in a continuing
cycle. Theoretically, within a monopoly are the seeds of its own destruction.
' United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 248 (D. RI. 1964).
'Senator George Frisbie Hoar (R. Mass. 1877-1907). The following dialogue
appears in 21 CONG. REc. 3151-52 (1890):
Mr. Kenna. Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is dealing in short horn-
cattle and by virtue of his superior skill in that particular product it turns
out that he is the only one in the United States to whom an order comes
from Mexico for cattle of that stock for a considerable period, so that he
is conceeded to have a monopoly of that trade with Mexico; is it intended
by the committee that the bill shall make that man a culprit?
Mr. Edmunds. It is not intended by it and the bill does not do it. Any-
body who knows the word "monopolize" as the courts apply it would not
apply it to such a person at all; and I'm sure my friend must understand
that.
Mr. Hoar. I put in the committee, if I may be permitted to say so, the
precise question which has been put by the Senator from West Virginia,
and I had the precise difficulty in the first place with this bill, but I was
answered....
... I suppose, therefore, that the courts of the United States would say
in the case put by the Senator from West Virginia that a man who merely by
superior skill and intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or manu-
facturer or artisian of any kind, got the whole business because nobody could
do it as well as he could was not a monopolist. . . .
'United States v. Grinnell Corp., 284 U.S. 563, 571 (1965).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir.
1945); In re Greene, 52 F. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1892).
1970]
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may find themselves unwittingly in possession of a monopoly with-
out having intended to put an end to existing competition or to
prevent competition from arising where none had existed. Yet, not-
withstanding these pronouncements, the realistic availability of the
"thrust-upon" defense has rightfully been questioned. This ques-
tioning arises out of several cases which suggest that to say one is
the passive recipient of a monopoly is to declare a principle un-
sound both in an economic and legal sense. To quote Judge
Wyzanski:
[Seven] decades of Sherman Act enforcement leave the inform-
ed observer with the abiding conviction that durable non-statu-
tory monopolies... are, to a moral certainty, due to acquisitions
of competitors or restraints of trade prohibited by Sec. 1. They
are the achievement of the quiet life after the enemy's ca-
pitulation or his defeat in inglorious battle."
Speaking in Grinnell, Judge Wyzanski predicted that the day
will come when the Supreme Court will hold that when a com-
pany achieves market dominance, a rebuttable presumption will a-
rise that such power was criminally acquired and was a monopoli-
zation punishable under section two.9 In Grinnell, the lower court
openly invited the Supreme Court to rule on the question, but as
.United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D. R. 1. 1964).
"Id. Apparently, Judge Wyzansky's interpretation of the effect of this
presumption would be that:
the Government need not prove, and in a well conducted trial ought not to
be allowed to consume time needlessly proving defendant's predatory
practices while in this dominant role. If defendant wishes to go forward,
it is free to do so and to maintain the burden of showing that its eminence
is traceable to superior skill, superior products, natural advantages, tech-
nological and economic efficiency, scientific research, or low cost margins
of profit maintained permanently and without discrimination.
Although Judge Wyzanski's presumption has not been accepted, Alcoa and the
cases decided prior to it, indicate a move in that direction. Initially, in addition
to monopoly position, an element of predation was required. This predation may
be characterized as cut-throat policies directed toward one's competitors. Thus,
unabashed pursuit of profits was lawful. Subsequently, however, this element
of predation was expanded into a concept of deliberateness, which not only
included cut-throat policies, but also the intent to monopolize per se as dis-
tinguished from the intent to extend one's share of the market. Thus, the nice
distinction must be drawn between the intent to gain a monopoly and the
intent to expand one's market. Though it appears only to have meaning in the
abstract, it does leave the courts much freer in deciding each case, as it provides
some degree of latitude in invoking judicial sanctions against those corporations
which the courts feel do not have the required section two scienter. For a further
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Grinnell was ultimately found guilty of section one violations, the
necessity of reaching the section two question was obviated. A
decade earlier though, the Court explained that the Act was not
aimed at size, nor at the lawful exertion of power, provided that
such power and size were the product of natural growth.' o Even
though its resources, capital, and strength may give the company
a dominating place in the business or industry with which it is
concerned, it is entitled to maintain its size and power that legiti-
mately go with it." The significance of this, however, may have
been glossed over by the Court in United States v. Swift & Co., 12
when the Court announced that "size is not offensive... unless...
it amounts to a monopoly.., but size carries with its an opportunity
for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved
to have been utilized in the past."' 3
The classic definition of the limits of the "thrust-upon" de-
fense is that the section two defendant must be the passive benefi-
ciary of a monopoly, following upon the involuntary elimination
of competitors by automatically operative economic forces. Thus,
a company has not violated section two where monopoly has been
thrust upon it. Yet the court in Alcoa admonished that the com-
pany may yet be held to have monopolized if its acquistion or
retention of the monopoly power is in part caused by other business
practices having an exclusionary effect.' 4 These acts may be legal
in themselves, yet in context evidence a "purpose" sufficient to
transform monopoly into monopolization. The one element that
tranforms lawful monopoly into unlawful monopolization, "deli-
berateness," might very well be the key to the availability of the
"thrust-upon" defense.'3 At least some related dependency does
seem to exist. This, however, raises a question which strikes at the
10 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 US. 417, 460 (1920).
u Id.
S286 U.S. 106 (1932).
m1d. at 116.
"
4 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
This case has frequently been criticized for penalizing enterprise. But the cases
decided under it seem to refute that criticism and instead declare only illegal
those monopolies maintained by poliies intended to discourage, impede or even
prevent the rise of new competition.
"'This apparently would not hold true when a company, existing in a
natural monopoly climate (one wherein there is only enough demand to support
one supplier), is faced with new competition. Here, a monopoly and survival are
synonymous and a company would not be prohibited from actively and deliber-
ately seeking to retain a monopoly.
1970]
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very heart of the defense. If some dependency does exist, then
the defense is not really an affirmative defense, but rather a failure
on the part of the plaintiff to make out his case, i.e., a failure to
prove deliberateness. Yet the concept is always thought of as an
affirmative defense, and is allowed as such. Clearly, this is the
law, but due to its elemental vagueness its application, both from a
standpoint of prosecution and defense, often becomes difficult.
Certainly, this purpose is characterized by elements of exclu-
sion and predation. In United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.,O the court spoke in terms of "unnatural barriers; they un-
necessarily exclude actual and potential competition; they restrict a
free market." The court intimated that if business policies failed to
encourage competition or tended to perpetuate their creator's
dominance, they may be treated as exclusionary. 17 A similar idea
was expressed in United States v. Pullman Co.,'8 where the court
held that Pullman's method of negotiating sleeping car contracts with
the railroads, though legal in itself, evidenced Pullman's purpose
to retain its monopoly position both in providing sleeping car ser-
vice and in building sleeping cars for use in its sleeping car service.
The court concluded that business policies legal in themselves can-
not be used to maintain a monopoly. Again in Alcoa, the Court
became more specific when it held "we can think of no more ef-
fective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportun-
ity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with its capacity al-
ready geared into great organization, having the advantage of ex-
perience, trade connections, and the elite of personnel."'"
Apparently in an effort to prevent emasculation of the Act,
the courts have not limited exclusion to matters not honestly in-
dustrial, but rather have broadened it to include maneuvers acti-
vated solely by a desire to curb competition.20 The courts seemingly
"' 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1933).
"T Id. In view of the court's language, an interesting question arises as to
whether a company is under an obligation to conduct itself in such a manner
as thereby promotes competition or merely to conduct itself so as to permit com-
petition. The latter interpretation seems more in line with the case law, al-
though at times one senses that a company is under some duty to promote
competition in so far as it is not unreasonably inconsistent with its own
interests.
50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943), afrd per curiam, 830 U.S. 806 (1947).
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are attempting to protect competition without penalizing enter-
prize by injecting a sense of fair play into section two. In the words
of one lower court, "competing fairly and aggressively regardless of
consequences to one's rivals is not condemned." 2'
It should be realized that although singularly important when
called upon, the "thrust-upon" defense is, indeed, a rara avis. The
very name itself imports overtones of passivity or even regression.
But as the cases clearly show, the defendant companies were far
from being passive. Though perhaps not bent on cornering a parti-
cular market, they actively pursued increased business and profits.
Yet, when found possessed of a monopoly, the courts often found
no anti-trust violation. The thrust is that the monopolies sanctioned
are not merely those that are economically inevitable and achieved
against the recipient's will, but also those that come about through
nonpredatory, nonexclusionary, and essentially fair competitive
practices. Just as the "thrust-upon" defense was allowed as a
protection for passive recipients of monopoly, the same protection
has been extended to those who were "innocently active."
Though it is an apparent contradiction to assert that one in
pursuit of business success can have a monopoly thrust upon him,
the courts have had little difficulty in allowing the defense. Al-
though no specific language was discovered, the court holdings indi-
cate that the defense can be advanced in two situations. The first
is where the monopoly devolves upon the defendant due to econ-
omic forces generally outside the defendant's control.2' This is
the traditional passive recipient. An example would be where the
defendant is the owner and publisher of the only newspaper in a
small town. The town is of such size that it can only support one
newspaper. As a result of the dominant market position the de-
fendant enjoys, he is the possesser of a monopoly. Aside from the
I Bailey's Bakery Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 718 (D.
Hawaii 1964).
E.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England Inc., 284 F.2d
582 (lst, Cir. 1960). See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 450 (2nd Cir. 1945), where the court held that "a market may, for
example, be so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the cost
of production except by a plant large enough to meet the whole demand."
"Bailey's Bakery Co. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 718 (D.
Bawaii 1964). But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945) where business poliies similarly aggressive were held unlawful.
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defendant's selection of that city as a place to publish his news-
paper, he has done nothing to create or maintain the monopoly.
It was simply the product of external forces over which he had no
control. It cannot be said that the defendant was guilty of any
predation.
The second is where the monopoly devolves upon the defen-
dant, at least to a great extent, due to internal forces over which
the defendant does have control. This is the innocently active
recipient. An example would be where the defendant owned and
operated a large bakery. Fearing encroachment into his area by
outside bakeries, the defendant made a large investment in new pro-
duction and distribution techniques, and in advertising. He also
undertook to intensify his promotional and sales program. Plaintiff,
also a baker, claims that the defendant is quilty of unlawfully at-
tempting to impede the entry of new competition. Although busi-
ness methods designed for and having the effect of impeding any
new entry into a market are a recognized exclusionary device, each
and every businessman has the right to aggressively resist en-
croachment upon the market for his products. Resultantly, the
defendant would probably prevail.
In the former case, the application of the defense is obvious.
In the latter, it is used in the sense that, while not seeking a mono-
poly, one was thrust upon him because of his own superior enter-
prize. As a matter of simple pragmatism, the latter is of far more
significance than the former if for no other reason than frequency
of occurrence. But the facility in categorizing these situations is
not intended to imply that the resolution of the problems inherent
in them is simple. As always, when legality is dependent upon the
facts, the dividing line between what is illicit and what is licit
is at best a shadowy one.
In the cases of both an active and passive recipient, the
particular company must, if it desires to avoid legal sanctions, dis-
cover and conform to a judicial code of business morality. The
difficulties intrinsic in this approach are obvious. Certainly, a rigid
code unresponsive to the changes in business or to the needs of
society would not be desirable. Though it must be flexible in its
demands, it must also be sufficiently definite to afford reasonable
notice.
The crux of the problem is that this code cannot be expressed
in "black-letter" erms, It must be concerned with business facts-
[Vol.72
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with individual company activities and relations among activities,
and their effect upon the market freedom of others and the con-
suming public. Hence, when considering the legality of any parti-
cular business practice, one must ultimately determine how that
practice effects competition. Available to both the courts and in-
dustry are several types of information that may be used in deter-
mining from an economic standpoint whether effective competi-
tion exists. In varying degrees all of these factors are elements of
market situations which bear directly on the presence or absence
of effective competition. This analysis is of importance for sev-
eral reasons. The factor with which this article is most concerned is
that the less monopoly that exists the more predation will be al-
lowed by those charged with enforcing the anti-trust laws.
A court's first consideration would be the number and relative
strength of the firms in the particular industry. For example, un-
less numbers are already large in a given market, a reduction of
numbers may involve some reduction of competition. Likewise,
where genuine economies of large scale operations, or other consid-
erations, permit only a small number of sellers, added vigilance
is indicated as to other requisites of effective competition. Where
sellers are few, each producing a significant share of the total mar-
ket supply, the courts are aware that any substantial change in price
or production by any of the sellers will have an appreciable effect
upon total market supply and price, and will tend to elicit respon-
sive changes in the prices and outputs of the other sellers. In fact,
when sellers are few, even in the absense of anti-competitive prac-
tices, the market itself may not show many of the characteristics of
effective competition. However, where the number of sellers is
large, with each one facing an impersonal market, and each one
able to do little to effect total supply or to raise the market price,
each individual seller has a greater lattitude in pricing.
In addition to total number, the courts will also consider the
relative size and strength of the competitors. This does not mean
that close equality of size is required, but only that the competi-
tion should not depend entirely upon competitors who are so weak
or ineffective as to exist by sufferance. If the latter exists, the




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss3/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Of special significance is the opportunity for entry. The rela-
tive freedom for entry of new rivals is a fundamental requisite for
effective competition in the long run, and will not be overlooked
by the courts. Recognition is given to the fact that as a
practical matter, the size of minimum adequate investment capital
and other factors may make the entry of new firms into even a
competitive industry a relatively slow or hazardous process. Ag-
gressiveness in embracing new opportunities can be interpreted as
an attempt to exclude new rivals.
A business should not engage in predatory preclusive tactics,
such that their natural effect would be to enable the user to
eliminate rivals without regard to efficiency, or at least to place
them under serious handicaps irrelevant to their efficiency. But al-
ways an indepth analysis is required to determine whether the
alleged laws seem to be at odds with the traditional concepts of
"American enterprise." At least from one point of view, urging one
to compete and then castigating him when he succeeds, seems
somewhat inconsistent. But this seeming inconsistency does help
to explain the "thrust-upon" defense. The courts are torn between
the pulls of their conscience on one side and the demands of the
law on the other. When the proper case arises, one in which a
monopoly was obtained by honest industry and ingenuity, the
"thrust-upon" defense becomes available. Whether thought of
as an affirmative defense or a failure in plaintiff's case, it is, in
any event, a judicial balm. It allows the court to protect the in-
tegrity of section two without applying its severe penalities to the
innocent monopolizers.
Aside from the above, few guidelines can be formulated with
any degree of accuracy. The most that can be said is that the
resolution of specific problems remains the task of that fallible,
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